A REVOLUTION FULFILLED, OR BETRAYED? THE
IDEOLOGICAL DYNAMICS OF THE IRANIAN
REVOLUTION
DECLAN BURKE

The Iranian Revolution is often portrayed as the black sheep of revolutionary
history: a triumph of right wing reactionaries over a relatively progressive - albeit
despotic - authoritarian regime, and the popular revolt that sought to overthrow
him for a more traditionally democratic system. This paper challenges this
narrative in depth, arguing that the development of the Iranian Revolution can only
be properly understood and contextualized within an Islamic framework that
acknowledges the nationalistic struggle against Western imperialism underlying
all of twentieth century Iranian history. Similarly, the consolidation of power by
Ayatollah Khomeni and the Shi’ite ulama must be considered alongside the broader
context of dissent and dialogue that characterize both the revolutions history, and
Iran’s present. While the present Islamic government remains unapologetically
totalitarian, these factors nevertheless prove that the political plurality that led to
the Shah’s downfall remain a part of the revolutionary past, present, and future of
Iran.

Revolutionary breaks from an established order are never the clean affairs history
often portrays them to be in retrospect. But no revolution has so surprised, nor
baffled, conventional analysis like the Iranian Revolution of the late 1970s. Despite
the rich and varied dynamics of Iran’s political history, the revolution would
consolidate a unique form of absolutist government: a theocratic republic rooted in
Shi’ite Islam, with nominally modern democratic representative structures
subordinated to an unelected executive council of clerics, and the supreme
leadership of the religious Ayatollah. While theorists of various stripes have
attempted to explain this outcome as the product of the exiled revolutionary
theocrat Ayatollah Khomeini’s unique influence, or the machinations of Shi’ite
clerical hardliners, the origins of the Islamic Republic lay in the people of Iran
themselves, and their long history of frustrated national ambitions at the hands of
fundamentally alien impositions of Western ideas and systems that intensified

HiPo Vol. 4

41

March 2021

throughout the twentieth century. Thus, when considered in this context, the Iranian
Revolution becomes the end product of a national effort to define Iran in truly
Iranian terms; and while inarguably imperfect, the Islamic Republic should be
viewed less as a victory of theocratic despotism over secular democracy, and
instead as the Iranian emancipation from the monolithic idea of the West in and of
itself.
The context of the Iranian revolution is often obscured by the strange insistence
that its uniquely Islamic results need to be ‘explained’, particularly within the
broader framework of revolutionary history and theory to which they seem largely
at odds. The prominence of Islam as the defining basis of the revolution, as well as
the implicit rejection of conventional left-right secular politics are treated as a
unique feature that cannot be explained without special analysis. However, this
assumption rests on a chauvinistic attitude that revolution is the province of the
secular, Western tradition first and foremost. In fact, the antecedents of the 1979
revolution are deeply anti-Western and anti-colonial, and date back as early as the
1905-06 revolution against the Qajar dynasty: itself a response to increasing
interference from European imperial powers in the economic and domestic affairs
of what was then Persia. 1 The later collapse of the briefly democratic government
of Mohammad Mossadeq’s National Front in 1953 at the hands of an American and
British orchestrated coup, and the naked imperialism of both Old and New World
powers throughout the twentieth century, only further demonstrated the threat
foreign influence posed to Iranian self-determination. 2 The fact that these events
remained a part of the socio-political fabric of Iran was clear in the actions of Shah
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi when he attempted to counter them through a
combination of material, and identity politics that began with the White Revolution.
Initiated in 1963, the primary aim was to bring the material benefits of the state’s
alliance with the West to bear on the people, essentially buying their loyalty through
prosperity. 3 While this had certain beneficial impacts on the urban middle classes,
particularly those close to the Shah, it also increased inequality, particularly in rural
agriculture where land was amassed by wealthy families at the price of small
holders. 4 The reforms would also plant the first seeds of resentment within the
ulama, who suffered from state appropriations of religious land. 5 This also created
a large contingent of unemployed labourers, whose migration to urban centers in
search of work resulted in expansive slums that surrounded Tehran and other cities
by the 1970s: a potent reminder of the system’s inability to disperse its wealth
Robin Wright, The Last Great Revolution: Turmoil and Transformation in Iran (New York, NY:
Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 11.
2
Ibid.
3
Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi, “Reconsidering the Iranian Revolution Forty Years Later.” Current
History 118, no. 812 (2019): 343.
4
Misagh Parsa, Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University
Press, 1989), 71-75.
5
Ibid, 194-195.
1

HiPo Vol. 4

42

March 2021

equitably. 6 Combined with inflation and declining spending power, it was clear to
Iranians that the ‘benefits’ of Western modernization were a far cry from what they
had been promised. 7 Meanwhile, Iran’s allies praised the regime as an exemplar of
regional stability and prosperity 8, which when considered with the Shah’s infamous
1971 celebration of 2500 years of Persian royal rule - of which he had no legitimate
claim to whatsoever - served as a ready symbol of both the state’s disconnect with
the people it served, and the Shah’s personal delusions of power and prestige. 9 With
the many problems in Iran coalescing around the Shah, it was inevitable that he
would become the focus of the coming revolution’s objectives. However, the
common focus of Iranian’s ire was a deeper dissatisfaction with the repeated
failures of western style modernization to produce genuine results for ordinary
Iranians. The combined effects of 1905, Mossadeq, and finally the Shah, was that
it created an undercurrent of desire for a truly Iranian state; a desire which would
likewise give a critical advantage to one faction of the disparate revolutionary
forces.
Understanding the outcome of the revolution requires a fundamental readjustment
of our understanding of the ideological forces at play, and their origins in the unique
landscape of Iran and its sociocultural and political history. Indeed, both the liberal
and socialist opposition would fall victim to essentially the same fundamental
mistake. In the case of the liberal National Front party, their attempts to spearhead
calls for a liberal democracy proved too little too late, and were further undermined
both by a lack of organization and resources, and an inability to maintain relevance
as the revolution escalated. 10 Similarly, Marxist and secular socialist groups such
as the communist Tudeh party and the Fedayeen militants failed to make any
significant headway outside of radicalized students and urban workers, and often
competed unhelpfully against each other. 11 Both also suffered heavily at the hands
of police and intelligence agency (the SAVAK secret police) repressions, even after
the crackdowns were lessened on nominally peaceful groups such as the National
Front. 12 In comparison, the religious establishment benefitted from its position at
the most important junctions in the development of the revolutionary movement in
Iran: the mosques, and the ideological work of the Iranian revolutionary sociologist
and theorist Ali Shariati. Despite their post-revolutionary image as a monolithic
Ibid, 76-77.
Peter Seeberg, “The Iranian Revolution, 1977-79: Interaction and Transformation.” British
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 41, no. 4, (2014): 487; Parsa, 141.
8
G. Hossein Razi, “The Nexus of Legitimacy and Performance: The Lessons of the Iranian
Revolution.” Comparative Politics 19, no. 4, (1987): 453.
9
Seeberg, 487.
10
Parsa, 186-187.
11
Zohreh Bayatrizi, “From Marx to Giddens via Weber and Habermas: The politics of social
thought in Iran.” European Journal of Social Theory 19, no. 4 (2016): 523; Parsa 180; Seeberg,
493.
12
Ibid, 180, 183-184.
6
7

HiPo Vol. 4

43

March 2021

organization, the ulama of the 1960s and 1970s were a divided and factious group
that played relatively little active role in fomenting revolutionary fervour. 13 In fact,
outside of the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini’s agitation, the majority remained
apolitical. 14 However, the mosques themselves became the lynchpin of
revolutionary movements due to their relative safety from the regime’s police
apparatus, as well as a rallying point for the masses of disaffected labourers who
increasingly formed the core of the revolutionary movement. 15 Within this
environment, Ali Shariati’s works would become the single most widely studied of
the pre-revolutionary period. Combining influences from Marx to Bakunin to
Sartre, along with anti-imperialism and Shia Islam, Shariaiti’s philosophy formed
the foundation of a truly indigenous Iranian ideology, based on a socialist reading
of Islamic theology that advocated Islamic community (umma) as the basis of
society. 16 The broad appeal of this socially minded, yet religiously evocative
message created a climate in which nearly all Iranians could find common ground
beyond simple opposition to the Shah. 17 These two components of Iran’s
revolutionary underground would not only provide the critical mass for the
overthrow of the Shah, but also provide important context for the character of both
the climax of the revolution, and the state building that followed.
The events of 1978 and 1979 that signaled the downfall of the Shah were more than
the overthrow of a tyrant and his apparatus of oppression, in that they combined
both symbolic and literal demonstrations of a popular judgement on the broader
system of ideas and values that the Shah and his westernizing state represented.
From the beginning of January 1978, the Shah’s attempts to create a sense of
popular legitimacy with pageants celebrating the White Revolution resulted in
popular marches and prayer meetings at mosques that blatantly rejected the premise
of endorsing the Shah’s westernization program. 18 When protests turned violent
after the death of a protester in Tabriz, the targets were explicit symbols of western
influence on Iranian society: Western cinemas, boutiques, and banks. 19 As
government repression turned deadly, the famous 40 day cycle began, where
intervals between protests became standardized around the traditional period of
Islamic mourning, following the death of a protester. 20 Thus civil disobedience
developed a rhythm that both helped mobilize popular support, as well as further
emphasize the implicit Islamic character of the protests and the movement itself. 21
Ibid, 217-218.
Baryatrizi. 218.
15
Ibid, 190; Ghamari-Tabrizi, 343-344; Seeberg, 489.
16
Bayatrizi, 523-524.
17
Ghamari-Tabrizi. 344-345.
18
Seeberg, 489.
19
Ibid.
20
Karen Rasler, “Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution.”
American Sociological Review 61, no. 1 (1996): 138; Seeberg, 490.
21
Ibid.
13
14

HiPo Vol. 4

44

March 2021

In turn, when the Shah attempted to blame Islamists for the Abadan Cinema fire
that killed 400 people, this was seen as a blatant provocation that further alienated
the Shah from the protesters. 22 Similarly, his inconsistent pattern of police
crackdowns, alongside later attempts at offering concessions and liberalization of
the state led to a switch from defensive protests against state violence, to active
demands for the abolition of the monarchy and the fundamental reorganization of
the state. 23 As such, when repressions returned in November of 1978, all factions
from white to blue collar workers, the bazaari merchant class, and religious
organizations united behind the popular call for an end to the Shah’s rule. 24 By the
conclusion of the revolution against the Shah, over 12% of the population would
directly participate in some form of popular action; and despite the
underrepresentation of the rural population, 25 this share vastly exceeded the
comparative percentages of both the French (2.5%) and Russian (1.5%)
revolutions. 26 The result is that the Iranian revolution was never a battle between
conventional ideological forces, united by convenience and circumstances to take
down a common enemy; but instead a genuinely popular revolution rooted in a
sociocultural landscape that implicitly rejected the premises of a culturally western,
monarchal autocracy. In this sense, the outcome of the Iranian revolution was a
foregone conclusion in that it would take on an Islamic character, since that was
the implicit desire of the people from the outset. Thus, when evaluating the events
that followed the departure of the Shah, and the state that arose in the place of
monarchal Iran, they must be seen in this context.
In considering the organization of the post-revolution state of Iran, the ‘victory’ of
the ulama, and the ‘defeat’ of liberal and socialist forces, can only be properly
understood from within the framework of the Iranian Revolution itself. The initial
confirmation of the Islamic nature of the Islamic Republic by referendum returned
overwhelming support from nearly 90 percent of the eligible electorate. 27 While
protested by several groups as undemocratic, the turnout demonstrated that Islamic
governance of some kind was clearly the desire of the population. By the time the
government had been established formally, it would attract strong criticism from
the left, as religious requirements on elected representatives barred atheistic
Marxists and many socialists from running for various offices, including
president. 28 While the first Majlis (parliamentary) elections would reflect this
handicapping of the clerics’ main source of opposition, 29 the decline in voter
turnout that began with the Majlis election and continued as crises compounded,
Seeberg, 490.
Rasler, 146-148.
24
Ibid, 147.
25
Parsa, 2.
26
Ghamari-Tabrizi, 344.
27
Parsa, 252.
28
Ibid, 255.
29
Ibid, 255-256.
22
23

HiPo Vol. 4

45

March 2021

led to a shift in both action and rhetoric towards the left by the government and the
Ayatollah himself. 30 In the following years and decades since the revolution, the
seemingly incompatible blend of democratic and Islamic principles that make up
the Iranian state have created a comprehensive and effective welfare state that has
largely eliminated illiteracy, and provides effective health and welfare programs. 31
Similarly, despite the often hegemonic depiction of the Iranian regime, the protests
over electoral fraud in 2009 demonstrate that Iranians are more than capable of
voicing descent, and that the internal politics of Iran include substantive differences
on the course the nation should take. 32 The endurance of the Islamic Republic, and
of the imperfect political order it represents, is therefore a story of an evolving
revolution in which political victory or defeat is a relative question. The only
certainty is that this uniquely Iranian answer to the question of governance is far
more deeply rooted and embraced by the people than the sum of its oft contradictory
parts.
The Iranian Revolution is simultaneously an entirely singular event in history,
while maintaining significant consistency with the broader themes of conventional
revolutionary theory. It grew from very deeply rooted dissatisfaction with a system
of governance that was as distant as it was oppressive to the national political and
sociocultural aspirations of its people. In Iran, this was further compounded by the
colonial dynamics which the country was constantly subjected to: imposed
economic and cultural values, the priorities of powers and elites that ignored all
popular input, and a government that never truly considered the people’s wellbeing
a priority. By the time the Shah’s rule had collapsed, the revolutionary movement
had encompassed a broader swathe of the population than any other popular revolt
in history. The numerical scope of the revolution was matched only by the seeming
diversity of its participants aims and goals. However, the common thread that
underlay the ideological goals of every participant of the revolution was a rejection
of the Western models and methods that had betrayed Iran’s sovereignty and
national culture to satisfy the interests of foreign powers and their ways. While it is
inarguable that the new regime has been imperfect and excessive, and that many
have suffered from the consolidation of the clerically dominated theocratic
republic, Iran has achieved a genuinely revolutionary emancipation from its former
international oppressors; and no people are better disposed to realize the potential
their revolution still holds for the future, than the Iranians.

Ibid, 257-258.
Ghamari-Tabrizi, 346.
32
Saïd Amir Arjomand, “Has Iran’s Islamic Revolution Ended?” Radical History Review 105,
(2009): 136-138.
30
31

HiPo Vol. 4

46

March 2021

BIBLIOGRAPHY
AMIR ARJOMAND, SAÏD. “Has Iran’s Islamic Revolution Ended?” Radical History
Review 105, (2009): 132-138.
BAYATRIZI, ZOHREH. “From Marx to Giddens via Weber and Habermas: The
politics of social thought in Iran.” European Journal of Social Theory 19,
no. 4 (2016): 521-537.
GHAMARI-TABRIZI, BEHROOZ. “Reconsidering the Iranian Revolution Forty Years
Later.” Current History 118, no. 812 (2019): 343-348.
PARSA, MISAGH. Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution. New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers University Press, 1989.
RASLER, KAREN. “Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian
Revolution.” American Sociological Review 61, no. 1 (1996): 132-152.
RAZI, G. HOSSEIN. “The Nexus of Legitimacy and Performance: The Lessons of the
Iranian Revolution.” Comparative Politics 19, no. 4, (1987): 453-469.
SEEBERG, PETER. “The Iranian Revolution, 1977-79: Interaction and
Transformation.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 41, no. 4,
(2014): 483-497.
WRIGHT, ROBIN. The Last Great Revolution: Turmoil and Transformation in Iran.
New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000.

HiPo Vol. 4

47

March 2021