THE SHADOW OF JAPANESE POSTWAR
NATIONALISM AND ZAINICHI
DISENFRANCHISEMENT
MARZIA AMBROSINI

This paper analyses the various modes in which Zainichi, ethnic Koreans who have
lived in Japan for generations, are disenfranchised in Japanese society. The use of
distorted cultural narratives about a “pure Japanese society”, historical
revisionism, and erasure of the Zainichi population all contribute to their current
situation. Through denial of birthright citizenship and the difficulties in obtaining
naturalization, the Zainichi are denied human rights and protections that all ethnic
Japanese people are entitled to. Furthermore, populist politicians promote the
erasure of Zainichi from popular consciousness because of their aims to amend the
post-war constitution. In spite of growing effort to move towards multiculturalism,
Zainichi remain outliers to these efforts because of their focus on newcomers to
Japan rather than acceptance of diversity that already exists.

With the planning of the 2020 Tokyo Olympics, the Olympic Committee stated its
commitment to “Diversity and Inclusion” (as stated on the Tokyo 2020 website and
in various marketing material). However, these goals can be seen as ironic and
perhaps even insulting in the face of how Japan treats ethnically diverse people who
live within Japan’s borders. Japanese people perceive themselves to be ethnically
homogenous. While a majority of Japanese report to support diversity, the myth of
Japanese ethnic homogeneity has been allowed to continue to benefit Japan’s rightwing Liberal Democratic Party; by erasing and ignoring the existence of ethnic
minorities in Japan they can further their goals of more aggressive international
policies. Japanese citizens are largely unaware of the positions and concerns of
“foreign” residents in Japan. Japan’s Zainichi population, in particular, remain the
largest target of xenophobic attacks and are unable to garner support to push for
policy change to improve their situation. This disenfranchisement is perpetuated in
several ways: first by making citizenship necessary to obtain human rights; second,
by creating high barriers to naturalization; and finally, by erasing public awareness

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of their position, and creating an education system that does not correct racist
perceptions.
The Zainichi are ethnic Koreans who initially came to Japan when Korea was a
colony of Imperial Japan between 1895 and 1945. All Koreans were considered
Japanese subjects that had Japanese citizenship. However, at the end of the war,
when Japan lost its colonies, these ethnic Koreans, many of whom were born in
Japan and had never been to Korea, became effectively stateless as their citizenship
was taken away. Those who did not leave Japan became classified as “Special
Permanent Residents,” a category of foreigners that are in effect stateless. Foreign
residents and Special Permanent Residents pay taxes and contribute to their
community, the same as Japanese nationals. It is unclear how many Zainichi exist
in Japan because census data does not include Zainichi in their questions, and they
are grouped with all other foreign residents. Many average Japanese citizens are
unaware that many Korean residents still do not have access to pension funds and
some social benefits and that they have limited access in areas of employment,
housing, and education, despite their long residence and history in Japan. 1
One of the biggest problems for the Special Permanent Resident Zainichi is that
human rights are tied to citizenship. Foreigners and foreign residents’ human and
social rights are seen as not being Japan’s responsibility to uphold and protect
because they are just “visitors.” This lack of human rights for foreigners is
reinforced at the through all levels of public office. For example, at the higher levels
of public policy, the Prime Ministerial cabinet survey portrays human rights for
foreigners as optional. On the prefectural level we see this perception reinforced
with a comment made in 2011 by a prosecutor from Saga stating that prosecutors
are taught that “foreigners have no human rights under police detention and
interrogation”. 2 Even with Special Permanent Resident status Zainichi are treated
in the same way as visitors, such as being regularly fingerprinted (like all foreign
visitors to Japan), having to carry government identification at all times and being
subject to police questioning at all times without probable cause. 3 Despite having
never lived outside of Japan for possibly generations, Zainichi have no right to vote,
contribute to political campaigns, hold civil service administration jobs, or run for
public office. 4 The Japanese Supreme court has affirmed their statement that
“human rights in Japan are not linked to being human; they are linked to holding
Japanese citizenship.” 5 On multiple occasions, and most recently in a 2008 decision
by the Supreme Court, it was determined that “a lack of Japanese nationality is the
Yoko Demelius, “Multiculturalism in a ‘Homogeneous’ Society from the Perspectives of an
Intercultural Event in Japan.” Asian Anthropology 19, no. 3 (September 2020): 170.
2
Debito Arudou, “‘Embedded Racism’ in Japanese Law: Towards a Japanese Critical Race
Theory.” Pacific Asia Inquiry 4, no. 1 (Fall 2013): 161.
3
Ibid, 158.
4
Ibid, 158.
5
Ibid, 161.
1

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cause of discrimination, and that obtaining Japanese nationality is essential for
basic human rights to be guaranteed in Japan.” 6
The pursuit of Japanese citizenship, which would ensure Zainichi equal rights, is
also a fraught issue. Some Zainichi do not pursue naturalization because of the
concern that it would erase their multi-ethnic identity. Naturalization also has a
historical association with the colonial legacy of assimilation. 7 However, for those
who pursue naturalization, the process is unduly difficult and influenced by racial
bias regardless of how long or how well integrated someone has been in Japanese
society. The vast majority of Zainichi have not obtained legal citizenship. 8 Unlike
Canada, Japanese citizenship is not conferred by being born in Japan, rather through
Japanese blood. Article 2 of Japan’s Nationality Law requires at least one parent to
be a Japanese national in order to qualify for citizenship regardless of the place of
birth. This lack of birthright citizenship means that for Zainichi who have failed or
chosen not to have Japanese citizenship, their child will not have citizenship at birth
no matter how many generations of their family have lived in Japan. Naturalization
is possible, but it is a difficult process. The Ministry of Justice claims that most
candidates who apply for citizenship receive it, but this claim becomes dubious
because of how many are rejected at the preliminary screening. 9 Before potential
candidates for naturalization can even process their application, they have an
interview at the Ministry of Justice. Candidates are questioned about their
commitments to Japan and then are told immediately whether they may collect the
necessary documents. The questions can be intrusive and personal, including family
and income. This subjective questioning also opens up applicants to harassment
from officials. In some of the examples that Debito Arudou encountered in his
interviews of past applicants to the naturalization process, two Filipina applicants
were asked about their sexual history, and a second-generation Zainichi was
rejected because he had parking tickets. 10 If the applicant does make it through the
questioning, then they have many official documents to retrieve at cost. Next, there
are other requirements such as and having achieved adulthood (20 years old) with
no criminal record, ability to support oneself without government assistance and a
vague requirement of “upright conduct” and to “uphold and not advocate the
overthrow of the Japanese Constitution or Government.” 11 These last two
stipulations are especially strong barriers for applicants because their vague
wording makes their interpretation up to the individual person reviewing the
application. Any protest or collective action to try and improve the status of fellow
Arudou, 161.
Yuka Kitayama, “The Rise of the Far Right in Japan, and Challenges Posed for Education.”
London Review of Education 16, no. 2 (July 2018): 252.
8
Demelius, 168.
9
Arudou, 159.
10
Ibid, 159.
11
Ibid, 158.
6
7

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Zainichi could be interpreted as violating of these last two conditions. Furthermore,
there is no right of review or appeal, only reapplication.
These issues that Zainichi face go largely unknown by the wider public because of
the structural erasure. Japanese people still have difficulties conceptualizing the
possibility of multi-ethnic individuals. We can see this in the rejection of dual
citizenship and ideas that even those who are half-Japanese are assumed not to be
Japanese enough to be included in conceptions of who Japanese people are, as
shown in the backlash to half African-American half Japanese, Ariana Miyamoto
being crowned Miss Universe Japan in 2015. Japan claimed to the UN in 1999 that
ethnically diverse people are not Japanese. 12 Through this statement, they were
trying to justify the unequal treatment of ethnic minorities while reinforcing the
idea that Japanese people can only truly be Japanese by having purely Japanese
blood. Furthermore, Japan’s census only measures citizenship, not ethnicity or
national origin. Data from the Ministry of Justice says that the foreign residents
only account for less than 3% of the population, but this number does not count
those who have obtained citizenship in the “non-Japanese” category, or the Ainu
and Okinawans. 13 The erasure of other cultural groups’ existence in Japan makes it
impossible to advocate for their rights because they must first prove to the larger
society that they exist before you can even begin to argue for their protection. This
is encompassed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs comment in 2001 that “since
there are no other races in Japan to have ‘relations’ with, ergo there can be no
racism in Japan.” 14 This myth of homogeneity makes the larger ethnically Japanese
society unaware of the discrimination that exists in their country. Any sort of
education that could help reduce the discrimination Zainichi face, such as historical
knowledge, is often censored in Japanese mainstream media, social platforms, and
education. 15
The suppression of rights for Zainichi people is critical for Liberal Democratic
Party and right-wing nationalist grassroots organization goals. The main goal for
the LDP for years was, and still is, constitutional reform with the aim to replace
Japan’s pacifist constitution that was created in the post-war years during the
occupation by the United States. Right-wing supporters want a new constitution
that promotes national pride, and includes the use of force as a sovereign right.
Those who oppose constitutional revision fear it would increase Japanese
involvement in international military conflict. It is no secret that populist politicians
like Shinzo Abe, Junichiro Koizumi, and former governor of Tokyo, Shintaro
Ishihara, harbour aggressive attitudes to China and Korea. They have all made

Arudou, 161.
Demelius, 165.
14
Arudou, 162.
15
Demelius, 170.
12
13

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remarks that justify pre-war colonization and invasion. 16 Koizumi and Abe have
also repeatedly visited Yasukuni Shrine, where Japanese war criminals are
enshrined, and Abe furthered poked at China regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu
islands. By revising the constitution, it would be constitutionally permissible to
attack their neighbours. The constitution also serves as a reminder to Japanese
conservatives of an inconvenient and unpleasant past of colonialism and defeat they
would rather forget, much like the Zainichi themselves. In conservative magazines,
articles related to Koreans in Japan focused on four topics: 1) voting rights for
foreigners and the right-wing establishment fear that it would pave the way for
Koreans to be enemies from within, 2) Korean intellectuals would oppose rightwing revisionism, 3) attacks against the pro-North Korean community
organization, the Chosen Soren (General Association of Koreans in Japan.) 17 These
concerns serve as a motivator to target the Zainichi as representatives of their
enemies hiding in their midst.
The main tool that the Right employs to ensure the erasure of Zainichi issues is
revisionist history in schools. Since 1997 the main talking-point for conservatives
has been the subject of history. Its importance was bolstered in magazines that were
published by the same companies that make revisionist history textbooks, such as
the Sankei Shimbun Co. 18 Current Japanese textbooks stress the positive aspect of
colonialism and either downplay or do not mention wartime atrocities 19. In
Japanese schools, teachers are required to instruct apolitically, i.e., “to refrain from
political education or other political activities for or against any specific party.” 20
That means teachers have to teach with the very politically influenced textbooks
without being able to counter the extremism it can instill.
The prevailing idea of how to help the situation of ethnic minorities in Japan is to
increase multicultural initiatives. However, these multiculturalism initiatives are
ineffective in their aim of making Japanese society recognize the different cultures
that live in Japan, and at worse, they serve to erase the problems of the Zainichi
further. In 2006 Japan introduced a national program to establish services for new
foreign residents by coordinating with local governments. 21 Foreign residents who
are not “newcomers” found no use for these initiatives as they focused on
immediate concerns of new foreign residents in Japan, such as language services,
help finding housing, education, medical services, labour protection, and
Naoto Higuchi, "The ‘Pro-Establishment’ Radical Right: Japan’s Nativist Movement
Reconsidered." In Civil Society and the State in Democratic East Asia: Between Entanglement and
Contention in Post High Growth, 122.
17
Higuchi, 131.
18
Ibid, 123-4.
19
Kitayama, 254.
20
Ibid, 257.
21
Demelius, 165.
16

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evacuation procedures during natural disasters. 22 Zainichi have no need for
language support and already know how to live in their local communities along
with the Japanese codes of conduct, so either Zainichi’s needs are not being
considered at all, or, by positioning Zainichi along with new foreign residents in
diversity initiatives it erases their history and particular situation and needs. This
makes it clear to Zainichi that they are not included in Japan’s “multiculturalism.”
The 2006 initiative was introduced under the perspective of increasing
globalization and internationalization, leading to new diverse people coming to live
in Japan, not the appreciation and tolerance of diverse cultures that already exists
in Japan. This motive for multiculturalism is also reflected in textbooks, as
Kitayama states, "Non-Japanese citizens in contemporary society are often
portrayed by school textbooks solely as unproblematic ‘visitors’ who represent
Japan’s ‘internationalization.” 23 Multiculturalism in this way is not an integration
of different cultures into Japanese society, instead it emphasizes boundaries
between Japanese and non-Japanese. The 2006 plan is also too vague to be effective
because it has an “absence of a clear goal, direction, and policy guidelines without
specifying what living on equal terms with Japanese should mean and
accomplish.” 24 Demelius’ participation in the organization of the yearly Akahashi
city intercultural event shows that these local events trying to foster
multiculturalism can turn to the commoditization of these cultures for Japanese
people to consume rather than accept and integrate into a multicultural society.
Moreover, any politicization of minority issues at the aforementioned event was
discouraged by the city administration, saying that they should make the event
apolitical out of concern for offending anyone. 25 So any historical information
about minority people in Japan had to be left out.
Zainichi still do not have the same human rights as ethnic Japanese, and are
excluded from pension funds, medical care, and suffrage. 26 However, simply
undergoing naturalization to gain those rights is difficult and opens them up to
harassment and discrimination because of the subjective screening process. The
Japanese who are able to participate in the political community by occupying
administrative roles in municipal office and education are kept largely unaware of
the situation of the Zainichi with the misconception that Japan is a homogenous
country, and textbooks reinforce this way of thinking along with fostering
aggression to their East Asian neighbours. Public policy goals and revisions of laws
remain toothless and shallow such as the Hate Speech Elimination Law of 2016
that neither prohibits nor punishes hate speech. Multicultural initiatives, by
focusing on the ‘newcomers,’ allow the government to have the perception of trying
Ibid, 167.
Kitayama, 253.
24
Demelius, 167.
25
Ibid, 172.
26
Ibid, 167.
22
23

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to improve tolerance and coexistence without having to reckon with or provide
reparations for their past abuses.
It remains unclear if, going forward, Japan will change its stance on Zainichi. With
the resignation of LDP leader Shinzo Abe and the Japanese government’s handling
of the Covid-19 pandemic, there are some questions about how these factors will
affect the support of the LDP. Covid-19 has shown a resurgence of xenophobia;
storefronts broadly putting up signs that say “Japanese only”; Japanese television
programs fueling the hatred to China and Korea by skewing testing results to show
them as having a much higher rate of infection than Japan; pundits and variety show
hosts reigniting the idea of Japanese exceptionalism by saying how to clean
Japanese are. However, during this time, we have also seen Black Lives Matter
protests in Japan. While some argue that this is yet another way for Japanese people
to distance themselves from racism by placing it as a “foreign” issue, the protests
in Shibuya were largely centred around an incident involving the police’s physical
violence against a Kurdish man on May 22nd of this year. Whether or not this
fervour will extend to protesting the unfair treatment of ethnic Chinese and Koreans
remains unknown, but with the internet, it could be more and more probable that
Zainichi and others can tell their story and make Japanese people more aware of
the challenges they face when Japanese mainstream media refuses to do so.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY
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HIGUCHI, NAOTO. "The ‘Pro-Establishment ’Radical Right: Japan’s Nativist
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